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THE EFFECT OF INFORMATIONAL CUES ON EMOTIONAL ATTRIBUTIONS

A THESIS

Presented to the Department of Psychology

California State University, Long Beach

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

By James Anthony Lani

B.S., 1988, California State University, Fullerton

August 1995

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ABSTRACT

THE EFFECT OF INFORMATIONAL CUES

ON EMOTIONAL ATTRIBUTIONS

by

James Anthony Lani

August 1995

Weiner's attributional theory of emotions argues that the specific type and intensity of an emotional experience is a function of the outcome's valence (positive or negative) and the pattern of causal attributions about the cause of that outcome. This study tested Weiner's theory by giving three-hundred and thirty-four students each of two outcome-related scenarios which contained informational cues about an outcome for an actor. Participants were then asked: (a) to make their own attributions about the causes of an actor's outcome on each of four causal dimensions of locus of causality, stability, personal control and external control, and (b) to rate the actor's emotional intensity on each of the emotions of pride, anger, shame, guilt, hopelessness. Results provided mixed support for

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Weiner's theory in that the patterns of causal dimensions led to predicted pride intensity in both scenarios, to predicted shame intensity in one, but not the other scenario, and did not lead to predicted anger, hopelessness, or guilt intensity in either scenario.

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THE EFFECT OF INFORMATIONAL CUES

ON EMOTIONAL ATTRIBUTIONS

By

James Anthony Lani

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My sincere appreciation goes to Dale Jorgenson for his guidance and patience, and to Bob Newman for showing me the playful side of teaching. Thanks Kari, Jim and Teresa for your loving support. Special appreciation goes to Gerry Hanley who lit my fire to learn by exemplifying passion for one's work. And to Michele, who believed in me when I did not and started me back on my path.

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TABLES

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Weiner (1985) theorized that the specific type and intensity of an experienced emotion are a function of the valence of an outcome and the attributions about the causes of that outcome. Specifically, Weiner's attributional theory of emotion states that the experience and intensity of pride, anger, hopelessness, shame, and guilt are influenced by an individual's explanations or attributions about the causality of an achievement-related outcome. Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest and Rosenbaum (1971) have suggested that such causal attributions vary along three separate and independent causal dimensions: (a) locus of causality, (b) stability, and (c) controllability. Locus of causality refers to the extent to which an event's occurrence can on the one hand be attributed to something about the actor (internal) or on the other hand can be attributed to something outside of the actor (external). The stability dimension refers to the extent to which the

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cause of an outcome is stable over time. A stable cause is a cause that remains constant in value over time, while an unstable cause is one that varies in value over time. For example, the cause of a good grade could be due to high ability (a stable cause) or to a good mood (an unstable cause). The controllability dimension (Weiner, 1979) refers to the extent to which the cause of an outcome is attributable to a controllable or uncontrollable cause. A controllable cause is one that is under the volitional control of the actor, while an uncontrollable cause is one that is not under the actor's control. For example, the number of hours spent studying for an exam can be due to effort (a controllable cause) or fatigue (an uncontrollable cause).

Russell (1982) has proposed that the controllability dimension can be broken down into two separate and independent dimensions; personal controllability and external controllability. A personally controllable cause refers to the extent to which an actor can control the cause while an externally controllable cause is a cause that refers to the extent to which others control the cause. Specifically, in attributing the causes of a single outcome, an actor can see the cause as high or low on personal controllability, and see others as high or low on external controllability. Weiner argued that for particular emotions, specific combinations of an outcome's

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particular emotions, specific combinations of an outcome's valence and the causal attributions about that outcome on these three causal dimensions influence the intensity of specific emotions. This attributional model of emotional intensity applies both to an actor's own emotional intensity as well as an observer's attributions about the emotional intensity of an actor. In this investigation, the focus will be on an observer's attributions about the causes of an actor's outcome and the observer's attributions about an actor's emotional intensities. Outlined below are specific predictions made by Weiner's model about the way outcome valences and casual attributions predict emotional intensities, as well as evidence regarding these predictions.

Emotions Predicted by Weiner

Pride

Weiner (1985) predicted that observers would attribute more intense pride to an actor when a positive outcome is attributed to an internal cause rather than to an external cause. For example, when a student receives a high grade on an exam (a positive outcome) due to her great effort (an internal cause), rather than to an easy exam (an external cause), she is predicted to feel more pride.

A number of studies support Weiner's prediction (Bizman & Hoffman, 1993; Graham & Weiner, 1986, 1991; Graham, 1988; Weiner, Russell & Lerman, 1978, 1979). In

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Graham, 1988; Weiner, Russell & Lerman, 1978, 1979). In Weiner et al. (1978) study, participants were given a story describing success or failure on an exam and various loci related causes for that outcome (e.g., Joan passed the exam because of her ability). After receiving the story, participants were given 100 positive adjectives (confident, ecstatic, proud, etc.) which could potentially describe the emotion experienced by the actor. The participants rated these adjectives on a 9-point scale from "not at all" to "extremely." The results showed that pride had the 5th highest mean rating for the cause "actor's ability" and the 3rd highest mean rating for the cause "actors personality." Ability and personality causes are highly internal; thus the results suggest that pride is associated with causes that have an internal locus.

In Weiner's et al. (1979, Experiment 1) study, participants were given one of six causes to 12 achievement-related outcomes. For example, an outcome involved either doing well or poorly on an exam that was caused by either ability, unstable effort, stable effort, personality, other people or luck. The participants were asked to think of a time in their life that related to the given outcome and cause. Also, participants were asked to give details of the event to prompt a more vivid recollection of the experience. Participants were then given three blanks to characterize their emotional

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reactions to the experience (participants were also given 13 positive and negative emotions in the instructions as words that may describe different types of emotions). The results showed that pride was the more frequently cited emotion to the positive outcome when the causes of the outcome were due to one's ability and personality rather than to luck or others.

In a later study, Graham and Weiner (1991) told participants to imagine that they had, in one scenario, successfully competed in a spelling contest, or in a second scenario, just fixed a broken appliance. The participants were then told that the reasons for the successful outcome was due to the student trying hard/fixing the appliance on their own or due to easy words/someone told them how to fix the appliance. After the reasons for the outcome were given, the participants rated the locus of the cause from "mostly due to me" to "mostly due to others" and feelings of pride from "No pride" to "a great deal of pride" on a 7-point scales. The results showed that participants attributed significantly higher pride ratings to themselves when the cause of the outcome was due to something about them (an internal cause) than when it was due to others (an external cause).

Also, Graham and Weiner (1986) have shown that children as young as 5 years of age were more proud when the causes of a successful spelling test were attributed to

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the children's effort (an internal cause) rather than to an easy exam (an external cause).

Anger

Weiner (1985) predicted that observers would attribute more intense anger to an actor when a negative outcome was attributed to causes external to the actor and controllable by another than when a negative outcome was attributed to causes internal to the actor and uncontrollable by others. For example, if a man misses his plane, he is predicted to be more angry if the reason was due to his ride to the airport choosing to stop along the way (external and controllable by another) than if he missed his plane due to his spending extra time in the bathroom due to sickness (internal and uncontrollable).

Weiner's (1980a, Experiment 2) study presented participants with a scenario about a person falling down on a subway. In one condition, the person had a cane and was apparently ill, and in a second condition, the person was drunk, carrying a bottle and smelled of liquor. Participants were asked to assume they were on the subway and to: (a) describe their feelings, and (b) to rate the locus, stability, and controllability of the cause. Twenty-seven percent of the negative affects, anger and disgust, were directed to the drunk, while only 3% were directed to the ill person. Additionally, t-tests revealed that drunkenness was rated as significantly more

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controllable and internal than was the illness; no such effect was found regarding stability. The results suggest that more anger and disgust is associated with controllable causes due to the actor. In experiment three of this study, participants were again given the story of the falling drunk or ill person. Participants rated the personal controllability and disgust towards the person on 9-point scales. The resulting significant correlations between these dimensions indicate that the more control the person had over their falling, the more disgust towards him.

In another study, Weiner (1980b, Experiment 1) gave participants a scenario about a student approaching a classmate for class notes. The notes were supposedly needed because the absent student: (a) skipped class to go to the beach, (b) had trouble with a change in eye glasses, or (c) received an eye treatment, and was wearing dark glasses and had an eye patch. Participants were asked to imagine this happening to them and to describe to describe their feeling in one word. The results showed that 40% of the reaction to the beach person was negative (anger), while only 3% and 11% of the reaction to the person with and without the eye-patch, respectively, was negative.

In Experiment 2, the same scenario and reasons were given to participants. Participants then rated the controllability of the cause and anger towards the person

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on a 9-point scale. The results showed that there were significant differences in the rated controllability and anger between the "beach" and "eye-no patch" conditions and between the "beach" and "eye-patch" conditions. These differences between the rated means indicate that as the rated control of the absent student increased, so did the anger directed towards him.

In additional support of Weiner's prediction, Weisman, Lopez, Karno, and Jenkins (1993) studied Mexican-American families who had a family member with schizophrenia. Family member emotions were obtained from a transcribed interview on the Camberwell Family Interview. Trained coders coded the family members statements regarding the perceived control the patient had over their schizophrenia (from "no perceived control" to "a great deal of perceived control") and affect (frustration, disgust, warmth, affection, etc.). Weisman et al. found that when the family viewed the illness as controllable by the patient, compared to uncontrollable, greater anger (displayed by critical comments) towards the ill family member occurred.

In another study, Dalal and Tripathi (1986) studied anger intensity by examining the attributions of denied help. A helping scenario and 8 causal reasons for not helping were given to participants. Each of the causal reasons were classified as having a locus, stability, and controllability component. The participants were then

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given a list of feelings, asked to consider each scenario and to write down the feeling associated with the scenario and the particular cause. In their study, anger was more frequently reported when the denial of help was under the control of the helper.

In a developmental study, Yirmiya and Weiner (1986) examined young, middle and older children for anger intensities when the reasons for breaking a social contract were either controllable and uncontrollable. Ninety participants were read a story about two friends who planned to meet after school. The story explained that one friend waited for the other who never showed up, and that the friends met before class the next day. In the story, the one friend asks the other why she did not make the meeting. Participants were then asked for four reasons why the friend did not show and to: (a) rate those reasons from controllable to uncontrollable, and (b) rate how angry the friend who waited would be. Additionally, the researchers provided 6 other reasons for the friend not showing. The reasons had been previously classified as either controllable (decided to play with another friend, watched TV, no longer wanted to) or uncontrollable (mother did not permit, rained hard, got sick). Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed a main effect for anger by controllability. For all age groups, the children were more angry when the reason for the breaking the meeting

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after school was controllable by the other rather than uncontrollable.

Also, Weiner, Graham, and Chandler (1982, Experiment 1) asked participants to recall a time when they felt angry and guilty and to rate the locus, controllability and stability of the cause. The results showed that the causes of both anger and guilt were classified as significantly more controllable by the target actor. In Experiment 2, participants were given four theme scenarios (failing to pay a debt, committing a crime, failing an exam, and needing class notes). For each theme, one of eight reasons for the outcome were given. The reasons were created by combining all possible combinations of internal and external locus, high and low stability, and high and low controllability. Participants then rated the anger towards the scenario character from "great deal" to "none." For all four themes, the results showed that (a) greater anger was associated with controllable causes, and (b) anger was greater when the causes were internal to the actor.

Hopelessness

Weiner et al. (1971) and Weiner (1985) predicted that observers would attribute more intense hopelessness to an actor when the cause of an actor's negative outcome was attributed by an observer to stable rather than unstable causes. For example, greater hopelessness is predicted if the reason the student was not accepted into a graduate

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program was due to his academic record (a stable cause) rather than to an unlucky application year (an unstable cause).

In support of Weiner's prediction, Weiner et al. (1978) gave a list of 150 negative affective reactions to unsuccessful outcomes (e.g., a student did poorly on an exam). The affective reactions to despair (related to hopelessness) were greatest when stable factors, such as the difficulty of the task or the actor's ability, were involved rather than to unstable factors.

In further support of Weiner's theory, Metalsky, Joiner, Hardin and Abramson (1993) investigated a theory of hopelessness by examining how attributional diathesis (a stable and global attribution) interacted with negative outcomes. These researchers obtained four assessments from abnormal psychology students three times during a school semester. The four assessments were: (a) the Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire which contains 12 hypothetical negative life events to which the participants rate the locus, stability, and globality of the outcome, (b) a self-esteem questionnaire, (c) a 60-item hopelessness scale, and (d) a 21-item Beck Depression Inventory. The results yielded a three-way Attributional diathesis x Self-esteem x Failure interaction for depression.
Metalsky et al. suggested that stability and globality play a mediating role in hopelessness.

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Shame

Weiner (1985) predicted that observers would attribute more intense shame to an actor when the cause of an actor's negative outcome was attributed by observers to causes both internal and uncontrollable than when the negative outcome was external to and controllable by the actor. For example, a student is predicted to feel greater shame when she blurts out a negative comment in class (internal and uncontrollable) than had she elicited a negative comment from a classmate (external and controllable).

In Brown and Weiner's (1984) study, three types of shame were listed: public shame, private shame, and shame. Participants were asked how similar these emotions were to (a) regret, remorse and guilt, (b) embarrassment, disgrace, and humiliation, (c) inadequacy and incompetence, (d) unhappiness. Participants were asked to rate each of these emotions as if its cause was due to either a lack of effort or to lack of ability. These causes are linked to the controllability dimension such that low effort is seen as a being controllable cause, while low ability is seen as being an uncontrollable cause. The results showed that humiliation (public shame) was greater when the causes were due to low ability rather than to low effort. Also, guilt was greater when the causes of the emotions were due to low effort than to low ability.

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In further support of Weiner's predictions, Bizman and Hoffman (1993) found that Israelis who felt the causes of the Arab-Israeli conflict were due to themselves (an internal cause) rather than to the Arabs (an external cause) showed greater shame. The emotional responses to shame and guilt were obtained by asking participants to think about continuing the Arab-Israeli conflict as an Israeli and to rate the emotions of guilt, shame, etc.. Participants then rated each emotion on a 7-point scale from "not at all" to "very much." Additionally, participants were given a list of causes that contributed to the conflict and asked to rate the causes on 7-point locus, stability, and controllability scales. Correlations between the emotional responses and the causal dimensions revealed a positive, significant relationship between internality and shame.

Guilt

Weiner (1985) predicted that observers would attribute more intense guilt to an actor when a negative outcome was attributed to causes internal to and personally controllable by an actor than when the causes were external to and personally uncontrollable by the actor. For example, getting caught cheating on an exam may elicit guilt—cheating is both internal to and controllable by the actor.

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In a study supporting Weiner's theory, Ellsworth and Smith (1988) asked participants to recall and describe a negative emotional experience. The participants then answered a 19-item Appraisal Questionnaire that measured responsibility, control, etc. on an 11-point scales. Also, subjects were asked to rate 25 emotional adjectives (guilt, anger, sadness, etc.) on 9-point scales. In rating these adjectives, the participants were asked to describe how they were "actually feeling" during the experience. ANOVAs on the emotional adjectives by appraisal revealed that the participants had greater guilt when they felt more rather than less responsible for the outcome (responsibility is both internal and personally controllable). Also, Bizman and Hoffman (1993, described above) showed that Israelis guilt increased when the cause of the Israeli-Arab conflict was attributed to Israel (internal), rather than to the Arabs (external).

In sum, previous studies have demonstrated that causal attributions are related to emotional intensity ratings whether the causal attributions are made in response to the valence of an actor's outcome or given to the attributer. Additionally, this relationship is evident whether it is the actor or the observer who is making the causal and emotion attributions. However, prior tests of Weiner's attributional model of emotional intensity did not consider other variables, such as the distinctiveness, consistency,

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consensus or importance of an outcome, which may influence causal attributions. This paper's central question is, will the pattern of causal attributions which Weiner predicted result in attributed emotional intensity hold when the causal attributions are inferred by the subjects in response to variables in addition to the outcome's valence? To begin to answer this question, it is necessary to consider these other variables which influence attributions of causality.

In studying attributions of causality, a number of researchers (Kelley, 1967; McArthur, 1972; Meyer, 1980) have identified variables—information about aspects of an outcome—which are thought to influence the attributions of causality. These outcome-information variables, which have to do with the nature of an outcome, will be referred to as informational cues for they inform and signal the attributer, or person making the attribution, about the circumstances of the outcome. According to these researchers, an attributer uses these cues as the basis for their causal attributions. Kelley (1967) and McArthur (1972) proposed that individuals use three informational cues—distinctiveness of an outcome, consistency of an outcome, and consensus of an outcome—in deciding whether the cause of an event's outcome is attributed to a person characteristic (an internal causal attribution), stimulus or circumstance cause (both external causal attributions).

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Distinctiveness refers to whether the outcome occurs to the actor only in the presence of a particular stimulus. The consistency cue refers to whether a similar outcome occurs each time the stimulus is present, while the consensus cue refers to whether the outcome occurs to others when the stimulus is present.

Kelley (1967) proposed the combination of informational cues of distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus information lead one to make one attribution about the cause of the event. Kelley predicted that distinctiveness information was related to an attribution about the stimulus of the cause, that consensus information was related person attribution, while consistency information was related to the time/modality (circumstance) attribution. Specifically, Kelley predicted that the informational cues combination of high distinctiveness, high consistency, and high consensus lead one to attribute the cause externally to the actor.

McArthur (1972) extended Kelley's predictions by examining the effect of combinations of the distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus of an outcome on person and stimulus attributions. In her study, a statement was made about an actor (e.g., John laughed at the comedian). Nine conditions were formed (eight experimental and one control condition). Subjects in the experimental conditions received information that this

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behavior (John laughing) was either high or low in distinctiveness, consistency and consensus. For example, one experimental condition received high distinctiveness (John generally doesn't laugh at comedians), high consensus (everyone laughed at the comedian) and high consistency information (John always laughs at this comedian). The control condition was not given any information. Subjects were then asked to assign the cause of the event to either the person (John), the stimulus (the comedian) or the circumstance (the situation). An analysis of variance performed on the frequencies of the attributions revealed that subjects in the experimental condition receiving the combination of low distinctiveness, high consistency, and low consensus information attributed the cause of the outcome to the person significantly more than subjects in the control condition. Also, subjects in the experimental conditions receiving the combination of high distinctiveness, high consistency and high consensus information attributed the cause of the outcome to the actor significantly more than the control group.

While Kelley and McArthur have identified variables which influence attributions related to locus of causality, Meyer (1980) has proposed two variables which influence the attributions of causality on the controllability dimension. Meyer gave subjects one of 16 stimulus conditions about a students performance on an exam. Each stimulus condition

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was created from one of two aspects on each of four dimensions. The four dimensions were the valence of the outcome (positive or negative), the consistency of the outcome (high or low), the consensus of the outcome (high or low) and the importance of the outcome (high or low). The four dimensions were operationalized as follows: valence referred to whether the student passed of failed the exam, consistency referred to whether the students high school standing was above or below average, consensus referred to whether 67% or 33% of others passed the exam, and importance referred to the perceived importance of the exam in influencing university admission. Each subject was given each of the sixteen conditions one at a time and asked to rate each of nine possible causes of the outcome on a 9-point scale. The nine possible causes were the difficulty of the exam, the students general intelligence, luck, mood, preparation for the exam, study habits, test taking ability, teachers ability or the teachers effort. Factor analysis loadings on the condition-mode and rating scales suggested that when an outcome was positive and important or when an outcome was negative and unimportant, the causal attribution for that outcome tended to be attributed to more controllable causes (e.g., preparation for the exam). Conversely, when an outcome was positive and unimportant or negative and important, the attribution

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for that outcome tended to be attributed to more uncontrollable causes (e.g., teachers ability).

In sum, Kelley (1967), McArthur (1972), and Meyer (1980) have shown that the informational cues of the distinctiveness of an outcome, consistency of an outcome, consensus of an outcome, importance of an outcome and the valence of the outcome influence attributions of causality on one or more dimensions of causality.

The Present Study

The present study differs from earlier tests of Weiner's theory in two ways. First, some of the prior studies, causal attributions that were made only in response to the valence of the outcome. The subjects were then instructed to rate an actor's emotional intensity based on these causal attributions. In the present study, the causal attributions will be based not only on the valence of the outcome, but also on four other aspects about the outcome. Secondly, some prior studies have specified the causal attributions to the participants and asked them to attribute the actor's emotional intensity. The present study permits the participants to infer their own causal attributions and then attribute emotional intensity to the actor.

Another question being asked in this investigation is whether the familiarity of the situation—the number of times one has experienced or observed others experience an

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outcome in an achievement domain—influence one's emotional intensity attributions. More specifically, when people are allowed to make their own causal attributions, will these attributions lead to the emotional intensities predicted by Weiner when the attributions occur in settings that differ in terms of their familiarity? For example, assuming one has a negative experience in both test situation (familiar setting) and in a speech situation (less familiar settings), will causes attributed to something internal and personally uncontrollable lead to shame in both circumstances?

Based on Kelley (1967), McArthur (1972) and Meyer's (1980) research on informational cues and Weiner's (1985) theory of emotional intensity, the present study presents observers with informational cues, and then asks observers to make: (a) attributions of causality about the actor's outcome, and (b) attributions about the actor's emotional intensity. In general, it is hypothesized that observers (participants) will attribute greater emotional intensity to an actor for a specific emotion when the attributions of causality made by an observer are in response to an outcome's valence, distinctiveness, consistency, consensus and importance conform to the pattern of causal attributions identified Weiner. Specifically, the hypotheses for the five emotions are as follows:

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Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Observers who attribute an actor's positive outcome to an internal cause will attribute greater pride to the actor than those observers who attribute that positive outcome to external causes.

Hypothesis 2: Observers who attribute an actor's negative outcome to a cause that has an external locus and is high in external controllability will attribute greater anger to the actor than those observers who attribute that negative outcome to a cause that has an internal locus and is low in external controllability.

Hypothesis 3: Observers who attribute an actor's negative outcome to a stable cause will attribute greater hopelessness to the actor than those observers who attribute that negative outcome to an unstable cause.

Hypothesis 4: Observers who attribute an actor's negative outcome to a cause that has an internal locus and is low in personal controllability will attribute greater shame to the actor than those observers who attribute that negative outcome to a cause that has an external locus and is high in personal controllability.

Hypothesis 5: Observers who attribute an actor's negative outcome to a cause that has an internal locus and is high in personal controllability will attribute greater guilt to the actor than those observers who attribute that

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negative outcome to a cause that has an external locus and is low in personal controllability.

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CHAPTER 2

METHOD

Participants

Three-hundred thirty-four students (98 males and 236 females) in an introductory psychology class at California State University, Long Beach participated in the study on a voluntary basis for class credit.

Procedure and Design

Each participant was given a consent form to fill-out (see Appendix A) and instruction were read to them (see Appendix B). Upon completion, all participants were then given a three-page questionnaire. The first page of the questionnaire contained demographic questions and the questionnaire directions (see Appendix C). The second and third page each contained a description of one performance or achievement outcome that consisted of a unique pattern of information about the outcome; a unique pattern resulted from combining one of two specific levels on each of the five outcome information cue dimensions (see Appendix D). The five dimensions were: valence of the outcome (positive

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vs. negative), distinctiveness of the outcome (high vs. low), consistency of the outcome (high vs. low), consensus of the outcome (high vs. low), and importance of the outcome (high vs. low). The presentation of these combinations resulted in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 between-participants design.

Each scenario consisted of a fictitious actor's (Pat) outcome in one of two performance/outcome domains. These two designated domains were thought to differ in terms of their familiarity to these participants. The first scenario, the familiar domain, described Pat's performance on a math exam, and the second scenario, the less familiar domain, described Pat's performance during a speech. Each participant was given the same combination of information for both stories to avoid the possibility of diffusing any influence that the information may have on the causal attributions. The presentation order of the two scenarios was counterbalanced across the 32 cells of the design. After the participants were given the informational cues in the scenarios, they were instructed to, "put yourself in the student's situation, and then evaluate the causes of and emotions related to the performance."

Manipulation of Information Cues

Information about the valence of an outcome was presented in scenario 1 (test story) as, "Pat received an *A* (positive) or *F* (negative) on the math final", and in

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scenario 2 (speech story) as, "Pat spoke *eloquently* (positive) or *froze* (negative) when giving the oral presentation in front of a group." Distinctiveness was represented in scenario 1 as, "In all other final exams Pat has taken, Pat received the *different grade from* (high) or *same grade as* (low) the math final", and in scenario 2 as, "When giving oral presentations in front of other groups, Pat performed *differently from* (high) or *the same as* (low) this oral presentation. Consistency was represented in scenario 1 as, "Pat almost *always* (high) or *never* (low) receives this grade on math exams", and in scenario 2 as, "Pat almost *always* (high) or *never* (low) performs as she did when giving oral presentations in front of this group." Consensus was represented in scenario 1 as "*Almost everyone* (high) or *no one else* (low) received the grade that Pat did on the math exam", and in scenario 2 as "*almost everyone* (high) or *hardly anyone* (low) else performed as Pat did when giving an oral presentation in front of this group." Additionally, importance of the outcome was represented in scenario 1 as, "The grade was of *high* or *low* importance to Pat", and in scenario 2 as, "The oral presentation performance was of *high* or *little* importance to Pat."

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Measurement of Causal Attributions

After reading each story, the participants' (observers') attributions of causality about the actor's outcome were assessed in terms of the participants' ratings of the cause on the Russell Causal Dimension Scale (see Russell, 1982). This scale measured four causal attributions on four attribution dimensions using a 9-point Likert-type format. The four attributional dimensions were locus of causality (9 = most internal to 1 = most external), stability (9 = most stable to 1 = most unstable), externally controllability (9 = highest external control to 1 = lowest external control) and personal controllability (9 = highest personal control to 1 = lowest personal control). In terms of measuring an observer's attributions about the causes of an actor's outcome, items 1, 6, 9 measured an observer's locus of causality attributions, items 5, 8, 12 measured an observer's external controllability attributions, items 3, 7, and 11 measured an observer's stability attributions, and items 2, 4, 10 measured an observer's personal controllability attributions. For each observer, the observer's causal attribution about an actor's outcome was calculated by taking the mean of the three relevant dimension items.

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Measurement of Emotional Intensity

The Emotional Intensity Scale measured the participants' (observers') ratings of the actor's emotional intensity on eight emotions using a 9-point Likert-type format (see Appendix F). For each emotion, the ratings ranged from *not at all* (rating = 1) to *extremely* (rating = 9). The eight emotions rated were hopelessness, shame, guilt, anger, pride, gratitude, thankfulness and surprise (only the first five emotions were predicted by Weiner to vary by attributions of causality, the last three were added to balance the number of positive and negative emotions).

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CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

The five hypotheses were tested in each story domain by means of univariate ANOVAs and Pearson product moment correlations. The ANOVAs were carried out by first making a median split of the participants' attributions of causality on each of the four causal dimensions. For example, to make the median split on locus of causality, the top 50% of the distribution of participants' ratings on the locus of causality dimension were designated as "internals" while the bottom 50% of the distribution of were designated as "externals." Similar splits were used to assign participants' to high or low stability levels, high or low external controllability levels, and high or low personal controllability levels. The ANOVAs were then calculated using participants' emotional intensity ratings for each of the five emotions from these splits.

As a manipulation check to ensure the median splits had the effect of creating two distinct groups along each of the causal dimensions for each hypothesis, ANOVAs were

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conducted between each median split on each dimension. The results from the ANOVAs (see Tables 1-8 in Appendix G) show that the median splits do divide participants' scores into two distinct groups at $p < .001$.

The correlational analyses involved correlating the participants' emotional intensity ratings for a specific emotion to their causal attribution rating(s) on one or more causal dimensions. In some cases, intensity was correlated with one causal dimension rating. For example, when correlating the magnitude of pride intensity to the magnitude of locus of causality ratings. In other cases, participants' emotional intensity ratings of a specific emotion was correlated to the product of causal attributions from two dimensions. For example, when correlating the magnitude of shame ratings to the product of magnitudes from the locus of causality and personal controllability dimensions. In these correlations, the product of the magnitude of the causal attribution ratings was first calculated (e.g., the product of the magnitudes of locus of causality and personal controllability were calculated), and then this product was correlated with the shame intensity.

Hypothesis 1: To test hypothesis 1, the analyses were carried out only for participants' who received a positive outcome cue. Additionally, to test this hypothesis, participants with attribution ratings in the

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top 50% of the distribution on the locus of causality dimension were categorized as attributing the causes of the outcome to internal causes, while the bottom 50% of the distribution were categorized as attributing the causes of the outcome to external causes. For the ANOVAs in each of the two scenarios, internals verses externals were compared with respect to pride intensity. For the test story, the ANOVA showed that participants attributing a positive outcome to an internal cause attributed higher mean pride ratings to the actor than those participants who attributed that positive outcome to external causes (see Table 9 in Appendix G), F (1, 158) = 4.63, $p < .05$. Additionally, the correlation between attributed pride and locus of causality yielded an $r = 0.24$, $p < .001$. This positive correlation was in the predicted direction, indicating that the greater the attributed internality, the greater the attributed pride.

For the speech story, the ANOVA failed to show that participants attributing a positive outcome to an internal cause would attribute higher mean pride ratings to the actor than those participants who attributed that positive outcome to external causes (see Table 9, Appendix G), F (1, 158) = 0.27, *ns*. However, the correlation between attributed pride intensity and LOC was significant,

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$r = 0.14$, $p < .05$. This positive correlation was in the predicted direction, indicating that the greater the attributed internality, the greater the attributed pride.

Hypothesis 2: To test hypothesis 2, the analyses were carried out only for participants' who received a negative outcome cue. Additionally, to test this hypothesis, participants with attribution ratings in the bottom 50% of the distribution on the locus of causality dimension were categorized as attributing the causes of the outcome to external causes, while participants in the top 50% of the distribution were categorized as attributing the causes of the outcome to internal causes. Secondly, participants with attribution ratings in the top 50% of the distribution on the external controllability dimension were categorized as attributing the causes of the outcome to high external controllability, while participants in the bottom 50% of the distribution were categorized as attributing the causes of the outcome to low external controllability.

For the ANOVAs in each of the two scenarios, participants' who were external and high on external control verses participants' who were internals and low on external control were compared with respect to anger intensity. For the test story, the ANOVA failed to show that participants attributing a negative outcome to an external cause and high external controllability would attribute higher mean anger ratings to the actor than those

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participants who attributed that negative outcome to internal causes and low external controllability (see Table 10, Appendix G), $\underline{F}$ (1, 100) = 3.82, *ns*. Additionally, a correlation was carried out between attributed anger and the product of attributed LOC/external controllability. The product was produced by multiplying participants' ratings on the locus of causality dimension (where a high value indicated externality) to that participants' external control rating (where a high value indicated high external control). Thus, an expected positive correlation would indicated that the more externally controllable and external the cause, the higher the rated anger intensity. The correlation for this scenario was nonsignificant, $\underline{r}$ = -0.08, *ns*.

For the speech story, the ANOVA failed to show that participants attributing a negative outcome to an external cause and high external controllability would attribute higher mean anger ratings to the actor than those participants who attributed that negative outcome to internal causes and low external controllability (see Table 10, Appendix H), $\underline{F}$ (1, 95) = 0.01, *ns*. Additionally, the correlation between attributed anger and the product of LOC/externally controllability was nonsignificant, $\underline{r}$ = -0.14, *ns*.

Hypothesis 3: To test hypothesis 3, the analyses were carried out only for participants' who received a negative

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outcome cue. Additionally, to test this hypothesis, participants with attribution ratings in the top 50% of the distribution on the locus of causality dimension were categorized as attributing the causes of the outcome to stable causes, while participants in the bottom 50% of the distribution were categorized as attributing the causes of the outcome to unstable causes.

For the ANOVAs in each of the two scenarios, participants' who were stable verses unstable were compared with respect to hopelessness intensity. For the test story, the ANOVA failed to show that participants attributing a negative outcome to a stable cause would attribute higher mean hopelessness ratings to the actor than those participants who attributed that negative outcome to an unstable cause (see Table 11 in Appendix G), F (1, 172) = 3.40, *ns*. A positive correlation between stability and hopelessness would indicate that the more stable the outcome, the more hopeless the intensity. The correlation between attributed hopelessness and stability was significant, $r = -0.21$, $p < .01$. This significant correlation in the opposite direction indicates that the more stable the attributed cause of outcome, the lower the hopelessness.

For the speech story, the ANOVA failed to show that participants attributing a negative outcome to stable causes would attribute higher mean hopelessness ratings to

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the actor than those participants who attributed that negative outcome to unstable causes (see Table 11 in Appendix G), F (1, 172) = 0.00, *ns*. Additionally, the correlation between attributed hopelessness and stability was nonsignificant, r = 0.00, *ns*.

Hypothesis 4: To test hypothesis 4, the analyses were carried out only for participants' who received a negative outcome cue. Additionally, to test this hypothesis, participants with attribution ratings in the top 50% of the distribution on the locus of causality dimension were categorized as attributing the causes of the outcome to internal causes, while participants in the bottom 50% of the distribution were categorized as attributing the causes of the outcome to internal causes. Secondly, participants with attribution ratings in the bottom 50% of the distribution on the personal controllability dimension were categorized as attributing the causes of the outcome to low personal controllability, while participants in the top 50% of the distribution were categorized as attributing the causes of the outcome to high personal controllability.

For the ANOVAs in each of the two scenarios, participants' who were internal and low on personal control verses participants' who were external and high on personal control were compared with respect to shame intensity. For the test story, the ANOVA showed that participants

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attributing a negative outcome to internal causes and low personal controllability attributed higher mean shame ratings to the actor than those participants who attributed that negative outcome to external causes and high personal controllability (see Table 12, Appendix G), F (1, 75) = 4.71, $p < .05$. Additionally, a correlation was carried out between attributed shame and the product of attributed LOC/personal controllability. The product was produced by multiplying participants' ratings on the locus of causality dimension (where a high value indicated internality) to that participants' personal control rating (where a high value indicated low personal control). Thus, an expected positive correlation would indicate that the less personally controllable and internal the cause, the higher the rated shame intensity. The correlation between attributed shame and the product of attributed locus of causality/personal controllability was significant, $r = 0.30$, $p < .05$.

For the speech story, the ANOVA failed to show that participants attributing a negative outcome to internal causes and low personal controllability would attribute higher mean shame ratings to the actor than those participants who attributed that negative outcome to external causes and high personal controllability (see Table 12, Appendix H), F (1, 51) = 1.08, *ns*. Additionally, the correlation between attributed shame and the product

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LOC/external controllability was nonsignificant, $\underline{r}$ = 0.25, *ns*. This positive correlation does indicate that the more internal and personally uncontrollable the attributed cause, the more participants attributed shame to the actor.

Hypothesis 5: To test hypothesis 5, the analyses were carried out only for participants' who received a negative outcome cue. Additionally, to test this hypothesis, participants with attribution ratings in the top 50% of the distribution on the locus of causality dimension were categorized as attributing the causes of the outcome to internal causes, while participants in the bottom 50% of the distribution were categorized as attributing the causes of the outcome to external causes. Secondly, participants with attribution ratings in the top 50% of the distribution on the personal controllability dimension were categorized as attributing the causes of the outcome to high personal controllability, while participants in the bottom 50% of the distribution were categorized as attributing the causes of the outcome to low personal controllability.

For both ANOVAs, participants' who were internal and high on personal control verses participants' who were external and low on personal control were compared with respect to guilt intensity. For the test story, the ANOVA failed to show that participants attributing a negative outcome to an internal cause and high personal controllability would attribute higher mean guilt ratings

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to the actor than those participants who attributed that negative outcome to external causes and low personal controllability (see Table 13 in Appendix G), F (1, 118) = 0.02, *ns*. Additionally, a correlation was carried out between attributed guilt and the product of attributed LOC/personal controllability. The product was produced by multiplying participants' ratings on the locus of causality dimension (where a high value indicated internality) to that participants' personal control rating (where a high value indicated high personal control). Thus, an expected positive correlation would indicate that the more personally controllable and internal the cause, the higher the rated guilt intensity. The correlation between guilt and the product of LOC/personal controllability was nonsignificant, r = -0.01, *ns*.

For the speech story, the ANOVA failed to show that participants attributing a negative outcome to an internal cause and high personal controllability would attribute higher mean guilt ratings to the actor than those participants who attributed that negative outcome to external causes and low personal controllability (see Table 13 in Appendix G), F (1, 117) = 5.91, $p < .05$. Additionally, the correlation between guilt and the product of LOC/personal controllability while significant, r = -0.22, $p < .01$, was in the opposite direction.

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CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

This study investigated whether Weiner's attributional model of emotional intensity would accurately predict an observer's attributions about an actor's emotional intensity when: (a) observer's are given information (in addition to the valence of the outcome) about the nature of an outcome, and (b) participants are able to infer their own causal attributions about the causes of an actor's outcome, as opposed to when they are given the attributions. Furthermore, this study attempted to investigate Weiner's attributional model when the attributions of causality and emotional intensity were made in the context of both a familiar and less familiar outcome domain. Overall, the results provided mixed support for Weiner's attributional model of emotional intensity.

The results generally supported the first hypothesis regarding the relationship between attributions on the locus of causality dimension and pride intensities. Specifically, participants who attributed an actor's positive outcome to an internal cause assigned greater pride to the actor than those participants who attributed that positive outcome to external causes. In the test

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scenario, the significant F value from the ANOVA and significant correlation coefficient supported the hypothesis. However, in the speech scenario, the ANOVA did not support the hypothesis while the correlation coefficient did support the hypothesis. In attempting to draw a conclusion about the mixed support from the speech analyses, it is thought that the correlational analysis provides a more sensitive test of the hypothesis because it assesses the strength of the relationship between the locus attributions and the rated pride across the entire range of variation, while the ANOVA required the locus of causality ratings to be split into two values, thus restricting the range of variation. Essentially, observers whose ratings were near the median on the locus of causality dimension bring the two groups' means closer together where they reduce the magnitude of the ANOVA's effect. Following from this reasoning, the results from the speech story lean towards supporting the hypothesis. Thus, the results demonstrated that the effects of the causal attributions on pride intensity persisted regardless of the possible influence of informational cues or familiarity of the scenario.

The results did not support the second hypothesis regarding the relationship between attributions on the locus of causality and external control dimensions and the assignment of anger intensity. Specifically, observers who

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attributed an actor's negative outcome to both an external cause and high external control did not attribute greater anger to the actor than those observers who attributed that negative outcome to both an internal cause and low external control. These nonsignificant results were present in both scenario conditions. An explanation for these results may lie in poor question design. In articles assessing anger (Weiner, 1980; Yirmaya & Weiner, 1986), participants were asked how angry the actor was at the stimulus of the negative outcome. This study only asked how angry the actor feels, without regard to whom the anger is directed. Thus, the actor may be as angry at themselves for the internally, low external control cause as they are at the other for the external, high external control cause.

The results did not support the third hypothesis regarding the relationship between attributions on the stability dimension and the assignment of hopelessness intensities. Specifically, observers who attributed an actor's negative outcome to stable causes did not attribute greater hopelessness to the actor than those observers who attributed that negative outcome to unstable causes. In the test scenario, the nonsignificant F value from the ANOVA did not support the hypothesis. Additionally, although the negative correlation did not support the hypothesis, it was significant in the direction opposite of that hypothesized. This negative correlation coefficient

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indicates that the more stable the cause of a negative outcome, the less the attributed hopelessness.

In the speech scenario, both the ANOVA result and the correlation coefficient produced evidence of a nonsignificant relationship between the attributions on the stability dimension and the assignment of hopelessness intensity. A possible explanation for all of these nonsupportive results may lie in considering which other causal dimensions interact with stability ratings when stability is used to attribute hopelessness intensity. For instance, in the test scenario, the participants who rated the cause as more unstable also rated the cause as less personally controllable. In effect, it may well be that the lack of personal control drives the emotion of hopelessness more than the stability of the cause.

The results gave mixed support for the fourth hypothesis regarding the relationship between the attributions on locus of causality and personal controllability dimensions and shame intensity. Specifically, participants who attributed an actor's negative outcome to both an internal cause and low personal control sometimes did and other times did not attribute greater shame ratings to the actor than those participants who attributed that negative outcome to both external causes and high personal control. In the test scenario, the ANOVA and the correlation coefficient produced evidence of a significant relationship

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between shame intensity and the dimensions of locus of causality and personal control. However, in the speech scenario, the ANOVA and the correlation coefficient were both nonsignificant. The evidence as a whole suggests that either the familiarity of the scenario or the familiarity interacting with informational cues influence shame attributions. If the present results are driven only by the familiarity of the scenario and not by the influences of the informational cues, they imply that Weiner's model for shame attributions just work in the more familiar settings. Thus, it may be easier to retrieve shame for the familiar situation than to create this emotion in an unfamiliar one. An alternative interpretation is that the informational cues had an influence on the causal attributions in the less familiar setting, but not the more familiar setting. Perhaps when in the less familiar setting, attributers look more closely to other informational cues to derive their causal attributions.

The results did not support the fifth hypothesis regarding the relationship between the locus of causality and personal control dimensions and guilt intensity. Specifically, participants who attributed an actor's negative outcome to both an internal cause and high personal control did not attribute greater guilt to the actor than those participants who attributed that negative outcome to both an external cause and low personal control.

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In the test scenario, both the F value from the ANOVA and correlation coefficient were nonsignificant. In the speech scenario, the F value from the ANOVA and the correlation coefficient were significant, but in the direction opposite of that which was hypothesized. The results from the test scenario suggest that the theory does not hold in the familiar scenario. Thus in the test scenario, it appears that the informational cues influenced the locus of causality and personal control such that they no longer led to greater shame intensities and/or that Weiner's theory does hold in this test scenario. The results from the speech scenario further reinforces these possibilities. Not only did the causal attributions not elicit more guilt in the speech scenario, but low personal control and external locus elicited more guilt than high personal control and internal locus. It might be that participants in the high personal control condition reason that although they controlled the causes of the negative outcome, they did all the could--in effect thinking, "I am not going to feel guilty where I have tried hard."

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Research Implications

The study's results point to a few general conclusions about the relationship among informational cues, familiarity of situation, causal attributions and emotional intensity attributions. First, in order to understand and predict emotional intensity, it is important to consider not just the causal attributions, but also how the attributions came about or were influenced (i.e. by informational cues) as illustrated by the failure to find support in results of hypotheses 2, 3, and 5. Second, the results indicate that the scenario or context in which the causal attributions are made may influence whether causal attributions lead to different emotion intensity attributions as illustrated by the mixed support for hypothesis 4. Third, it is important to understand that sometimes emotional intensity ratings may be less dependent upon the influences of informational cues and the context as illustrated by support for hypotheses 1. The point of the entire study was to test Weiner's theory and to better understand the determinants of emotional intensity. To this end, this study adds to the attribution literature by demonstrating that other variables, as well as the context of the outcome, do indeed influence causal attributions and subsequent emotional intensities.

There were several limitations to this study which may have influenced its reliability and external validity. The

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reliability of the observer's attributers was assessed using three questions for each of the four casual attributional dimensions and one question for each of the emotional intensity ratings. To ensure greater reliability for the emotional intensity ratings, and to a less extent the attributions on each causal dimension, it might be possible to increase the number of items for these variables. The next study may perhaps add a number of parallel measures for the emotional intensities and a longer form to assess causal ascriptions.

In terms of the generalizability of the results, this study used only college freshman. How these students think about and attribute the reasons for a test, speech, or other outcomes and their range of emotional experiences may well differ from the general, perhaps older, population. Additionally, this study utilized only the observer's perspective. Perhaps future studies can assess the causes and emotional intensities of an actor's outcome and then assess observer's attributions about these actor's outcomes to ensure comparable results.

Future Research

Certainly one problem in Weiner's model and in the present test of his model is that it does not identify the direct influence of variables on the causal attributions upon which emotional intensities are based. If Weiner's model is correct, then the nonsignificant results from this

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study do indeed indicate that informational cues and context influence causal attributions. These and other possible influences need to be further investigated. Maybe one's current emotional state or overall dispositions matter in causal and emotional intensity attributions.

To get at the underlying causes of emotional intensities, a future study might first ask actors about a range of emotional experiences. Then, for each emotional experience, the actors could list their causal attributions, and most importantly, how they arrived at those attributions (i.e. what information led to those causal attributions). These open-ended responses about their causal attributions could then be factor analyzed to see which factors influence particular causal attributions. These factors can then be systematically varied to investigate their direct influence on causal attributions. When we better know the factors which underlie causal attributions, we may get closer to understanding the nature of emotions and the influences of their intensities.

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APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A

INFORMED CONSENT

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INFORMED CONSENT

You are being asked to participate in a research project. Part of the project involves your reading two stories. Each story is about a fictitious person and an event that happens to them. For each story, you will be asked to answer: (a) twelve questions about the reasons for the event's occurrence, and (b) eight questions about how this fictitious person might feel about the event's occurrence.

If you agree to participate in this study you will receive 3 points for this class. Participation in this study will not involve any foreseen risk or discomfort to you. You may discontinue your participation in the study at any time while retaining the 3 points. All of your responses will be made anonymously and will be coded and analyzed by assigned subject number only. Consent forms and questionnaires will be collected separately. Consent forms will be passed (face down) to the front of the room and collected. Then, questionnaires will be passed (face down) to the front of the room and collected.

Any questions you may have about the research may be obtained by contacting Dr. Dale Jorgenson at XXXXX XXXXXXXX or me, James Lani, at XXXXX XXXXXXXXX. Questions pertaining to research participants' rights can be answered at the CSULB Office of University Research at (310) 985-5314.

Your participation is completely voluntary. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may discontinue your participation at any time without such penalty or loss of benefits.

After the questionnaires are turned in, you will have an opportunity to ask whatever questions you may have about your experience. Thank you.

Signature of participant _____ Date _____

Print Name _____

Class ID# (Last four digits only)_____

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APPENDIX B

INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS

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Oral Instructions

Hello, my name is Jim Lani. I am a graduate student at California State University, Long Beach. I am conducting a study as part of the requirements for the completion of my Master's Degree.

You are being asked to participate in a research survey. The survey involves your reading of two stories. Each story is about a fictitious person and an event that happens to them. For each story, you will be asked to answer : (a) twelve questions about the reasons for the event's occurrence, and (b) eight questions about how this fictitious person might feel about the event's occurrence (forty questions in all). You may respond to each question be circling the answer that best corresponds to your belief about the person in the story. There are no right or wrong answers.

If you agree to participate in this study you will receive 3 points for this class (Psychology 100). The expected duration of your participation will be no longer than 10 minutes. Your participation in this study will not involve any foreseen risk or discomfort to you and you may discontinue your participation at any time while retaining the 3 points for the class. All of your responses will be made anonymously and will be coded and analyzed by subject number only. Your participation is completely voluntary. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

Your consent forms and questionnaires will be collected separately. Consent forms will be passed (face down) to the front of the room and collected. Then, questionnaires will be passed (face down) to the front of the room and collected.

Thank you for your assistance in this study.

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APPENDIX C

DEMOGRAPHICS AND INSTRUCTIONS

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General information

1. Last 4 digits of your social security number _____

2. Gender (check one) __ Female __ Male

3. Age ____

4. Ethnicity (check one)

American Indian/ Alaskan __ Asian__ Black (Non-Hispanic) __
Chicano/Mexican American__ Hispanic__White(Non-Hispanic) __
Other Hispanic__Filipino__Pacific Islander__
Unknown__

5. The approximate income of the head of your household (self, parents, etc.).
(Check one)Under $10K__ $10K-30K__ $30K-$50K__ Over$50K __

Directions
Two stories are given about Pat's performance. One is about Pat's performance on a math exam and the other is about Pat's performance when giving an oral presentation in front of a group. There are two purposes of this study.

1) Is to see how you explain the causes of Pat's performance.
2) Is to see how you think Pat would feel about the performance.

Please read and consider all of five pieces of information surrounding Pat's performance, and then for each question place a check next in one of the parentheses that best describes the cause of Pat's performance and how Pat might feel.

To answer the questions, you may wish to put yourself in Pat's situation and then to evaluate the causes of the performance and how you would feel.

There is no time limit, so please read and evaluate the questions very carefully. There are no right answers--all that is required is your careful evaluation.
Thank you for your participation in this study!

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APPENDIX D

32 INFORMATIONAL CUES

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1. Positive Outcome, Low Consist, Low Consensus, Low Distinct, Low Import
2. Positive Outcome, High Consist, Low Consensus, Low Distinct, Low Import
3. Positive Outcome, Low Consist, High Consensus, Low Distinct, Low Import
4. Positive Outcome, Low Consist, Low Consensus, High Distinct, Low Import
5. Positive Outcome, Low Consist, Low Consensus, Low Distinct, High Import
6. Positive Outcome, High Consist, High Consensus, Low Distinct, Low Import
7. Positive Outcome, High Consist , Low Consensus, High Distinct, Low Import
8. Positive Outcome, High Consist, Low Consensus, Low Distinct, High Import
9. Positive Outcome, Low Consist, High Consensus, High Distinct, Low Import
10. Positive Outcome, Low Consist, High Consensus, Low Distinct, High Import
11. Positive Outcome, Low Consist, Low Consensus, High Distinct,High Import
12. Positive Outcome, High Consist, High Consensus, High Distinct, Low Import
13. Positive Outcome, High Consist, High Consensus, Low Distinct, High Import
14. Positive Outcome, High Consist, Low Consensus, High Distinct, High Import
15. Positive Outcome, Low Consist, High Consensus, High Distinct,High Import
16. Positive Outcome, High Consist, High Consensus, High Distinct,High Import
17. Negative Outcome, Low Consist, Low Consensus, Low Distinct, Low Import
18. Negative Outcome, High Consist, Low Consensus, Low Distinct, Low Import
19. Negative Outcome, Low Consist, High Consensus,Low Distinct, Low Import
20. Negative Outcome, Low Consist, Low Consensus, High Distinct,Low Import
21. Negative Outcome, Low Consist, Low Consensus, Low Distinct, High Import
22. Negative Outcome, High Consist, High Consensus,Low Distinct, Low Import
23. Negative Outcome, High Consist, Low Consensus, High Distinct,Low Import
24. Negative Outcome, High Consist, Low Consensus, Low Distinct, High Import
25. Negative Outcome, Low Consist, High Consensus,High Distinct,Low Import
26. Negative Outcome, Low Consist, High Consensus,Low Distinct, High Import
27. Negative Outcome, Low Consist, Low Consensus, High Distinct,High Import
29. Negative Outcome, High Consist, High Consensus,High Distinct,Low Import
29. Negative Outcome, High Consist, High Consensus,Low Distinct, High Import
30. Negative Outcome, High Consist, Low Consensus, High Distinct,High Import
31. Negative Outcome, Low Consist, High Consensus,High Distinct,High Import
32. Negative Outcome, High Consist, High Consensus,High Distinct,High Import

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APPENDIX E

EMOTIONAL INTENSITY SCALE

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Emotional Intensity Scale

Pat is Hopeless.
Not at all ( )( )( )( )( )( )( )( ) Extremely

Pat is Ashamed.
Not at all ( )( )( )( )( )( )( )( ) Extremely

Pat feels Guilty.
Not at all ( )( )( )( )( )( )( )( ) Extremely

Pat feels Angry.
Not at all ( )( )( )( )( )( )( )( ) Extremely

Pat feels Proud.
Not at all ( )( )( )( )( )( )( )( ) Extremely

Pat feels Gratitude.
Not at all ( )( )( )( )( )( )( )( ) Extremely

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APPENDIX F

TABLES

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TABLE 1

RATINGS ON THE LOCUS OF CAUSALITY DIMENSION FOR CONDITIONS LEADING TO MORE AND LESS PRIDE INTENSITY BY SCENARIO

	Locus of Causality					
	Test Scenario			Speech Scenario		
	n	M[a]	SD	n	M[b]	SD
Condition Leading To More Pride Intensity	85	23.20	2.32	80	22.43	2.53
Condition Leading To Less Pride Intensity	75	14.73	3.78	80	14.85	2.86
Entire Sample	160	19.24	5.24	160	18.64	4.66

Note. All values reflect ratings from only the positive outcome conditions.

[a] $F\ (1, 158) = 300.31$, $p < .001$.

[b] $F\ (1, 158) = 314.86$, $p < .001$.

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TABLE 2

RATINGS ON THE LOCUS OF CAUSALITY AND EXTERNAL CONTROLLABILITY DIMENSIONS LEADING TO MORE OR LESS ANGER BY TEST SCENARIO

	Locus of Causality			External Controllability		
	n	M[a]	SD	n	M[b]	SD
Condition Leading To More Anger Intensity	49	13.31	3.41	49	15.94	3.52
Condition Leading To Less Anger Intensity	53	22.00	2.67	53	7.21	2.53
Entire Sample	102	17.84	5.31	102	11.31	5.33

Note. All values reflect ratings from only the negative outcome conditions.

[a] $F\ (1, 100) = 207.73$, $p < .001$.

[b] $F\ (1, 100) = 209.26$, $p < .001$.

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TABLE 3

RATINGS ON THE LOCUS OF CAUSALITY AND EXTERNAL CONTROLLABILITY DIMENSIONS LEADING TO MORE OR LESS ANGER BY SPEECH SCENARIO

	Locus of Causality			External Controllability		
	n	M[a]	SD	n	M[b]	SD
Condition Leading To More Anger Intensity	45	13.00	2.84	45	16.56	2.19
Condition Leading To Less Anger Intensity	52	22.89	2.85	52	7.89	3.39
Entire Sample	97	17.22	4.86	97	11.91	5.21

Note. All values reflect ratings from only the negative outcome conditions.

[a] $F\ (1, 95) = 185.19$, $p < .001$.

[b] $F\ (1, 95) = 216.35$, $p < .001$.

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TABLE 4

RATINGS ON THE STABILITY DIMENSION FOR CONDITIONS LEADING TO MORE AND LESS HOPELESSNESS INTENSITY BY SCENARIO

	Stability					
	Test Scenario			Speech Scenario		
	n	M[a]	SD	n	M[b]	SD
Condition Leading To More Pride Intensity	92	14.89	3.61	88	14.46	3.02
Condition Leading To Less Pride Intensity	82	6.98	2.12	86	7.19	2.18
Entire Sample	174	11.16	4.97	174	10.87	4.50

Note. All values reflect ratings from only the positive outcome conditions.

[a] F (1, 170) = 301.29, $p < .001$.

[b] F (1, 170) = 330.78, $p < .001$.

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TABLE 5

RATINGS ON THE LOCUS OF CAUSALITY AND PERSONAL CONTROLLABILITY DIMENSIONS LEADING TO MORE OR LESS SHAME BY TEST SCENARIO

	Locus of Causality			Personal Controllability		
	n	M[a]	SD	n	M[b]	SD
Condition Leading To More Shame Intensity	18	23.00	1.94	18	12.94	3.23
Condition Leading To Less Shame Intensity	22	14.27	2.05	22	19.82	2.34
Entire Sample	40	18.20	4.82	40	16.73	4.41

Note. All values reflect ratings from only the negative outcome conditions.

[a] $F(1, 38) = 188.06$, $p < .001$.

[b] $F(1, 38) = 60.83$, $p < .001$

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TABLE 6

RATINGS ON THE LOCUS OF CAUSALITY AND PERSONAL CONTROLLABILITY DIMENSIONS LEADING TO MORE OR LESS SHAME BY SPEECH SCENARIO

	Locus of Causality			Personal Controllability		
	n	M[a]	SD	n	M[b]	SD
Condition Leading To More Shame Intensity	22	19.23	1.86	22	13.82	3.14
Condition Leading To Less Shame Intensity	31	12.87	3.30	31	20.45	2.42
Entire Sample	53	15.53	4.22	53	17.70	4.27

Note. All values reflect ratings from only the negative outcome conditions.

[a] $F\ (1, 51) = 67.26$, $p < .001$.

[b] $F\ (1, 51) = 75.41$, $p < .001$.

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TABLE 7

RATINGS ON THE LOCUS OF CAUSALITY AND PERSONAL CONTROLLABILITY DIMENSIONS LEADING TO MORE OR LESS GUILT BY TEST SCENARIO

	Locus of Causality			Personal Controllability		
	n	M[a]	SD	n	M[b]	SD
Condition Leading To More Guilt Intensity	63	22.67	2.79	63	22.91	2.81
Condition Leading To Less Guilt Intensity	51	13.26	3.67	51	12.71	3.43
Entire Sample	114	18.45	5.67	114	18.35	5.97

Note. All values reflect ratings from only the negative outcome conditions.

[a] $F\ (1, 110) = 223.13$, $p < .001$.

[b] $F\ (1, 110) = 270.54$, $p < .001$.

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TABLE 8

RATINGS ON THE LOCUS OF CAUSALITY AND PERSONAL CONTROLLABILITY DIMENSIONS LEADING TO MORE OR LESS GUILT BY SPEECH SCENARIO

	Locus of Causality			External Controllability		
	n	M[a]	SD	n	M[b]	SD
Condition Leading To More Guilt Intensity	65	20.80	2.91	65	22.54	2.69
Condition Leading To Less Guilt Intensity	54	12.87	2.85	54	13.54	3.29
Entire Sample	119	17.20	4.90	119	18.45	5.38

Note. All values reflect ratings from only the negative outcome conditions.

[a] $F\ (1, 117) = 223.13$, $p < .001$.

[b] $F\ (1, 117) = 270.54$, $p < .001$.

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TABLE 9

PRIDE RATINGS FOR CONDITIONS LEADINGTO MORE AND LESS PRIDE INTENSITY BY SCENARIO

	Test Scenario			Speech Scenario		
	n	M[a]	SD	n	M[b]	SD
Condition Leading To More Pride Intensity	85	7.11	2.55	80	6.36	2.78
Condition Leading To Less Pride Intensity	75	6.22	2.67	80	5.63	2.80

Note. All values reflect ratings from only the positive outcome conditions.

[a] $F\ (1, 158) = 4.63$, $p < .05$.

[b] $F\ (1, 158) = 0.27$, *ns*.

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TABLE 10

ANGER RATINGS FOR CONDITIONS LEADING TO MORE AND LESS ANGER INTENSITY BY SCENARIO

	Test Scenario			Speech Scenario		
	n	M[a]	SD	n	M[b]	SD
Condition Leading To More Anger Intensity	49	6.14	2.42	45	5.51	2.69
Condition Leading To Less Anger Intensity	53	5.11	2.87	52	5.54	2.66

Note. All values reflect ratings from only the negative outcome conditions.

[a] $F\ (1, 102) = 3.82$, *ns*.

[b] $F\ (1, 95) = 0.003$, *ns*.

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TABLE 11

HOPELESSNESS RATINGS FOR CONDITIONS LEADING TO MORE AND LESS HOPELESSNESS INTENSITY BY SCENARIO

	Test Scenario			Speech Scenario		
	n	M[a]	SD	n	M[b]	SD
Condition Leading To More Hopelessness Intensity	92	5.61	2.76	88	5.56	2.34
Condition Leading To Less Hopelessness Intensity	82	6.34	2.45	86	5.54	2.51

Note. All values reflect ratings from only the negative outcome conditions.

[a] $F\ (1, 170) = 3.40$, *ns*.

[b] $F\ (1, 172) = 0.00$, *ns*.

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TABLE 12

SHAME RATINGS FOR CONDITIONS LEADING TO MORE AND LESS SHAME INTENSITY BY SCENARIO

	Test Scenario			Speech Scenario		
	n	M[a]	SD	n	M[b]	SD
Condition Leading To More Shame Intensity	18	7.11	1.94	22	5.95	1.19
Condition Leading To Less Shame Intensity	22	5.96	2.08	31	5.39	1.98

Note. All values reflect ratings from only the negative outcome conditions.

[a] $F\ (1, 38) = 3.25$, *ns*.

[b] $F\ (1, 51) = 1.09$, *ns*.

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TABLE 13

GUILT RATINGS FOR CONDITIONS LEADING TO MORE AND LESS GUILT INTENSITY BY SCENARIO

	Test Scenario			Speech Scenario		
	n	M[a]	SD	n	M[b]	SD
Condition Leading To More Guilt Intensity	63	4.76	2.73	65	4.49	2.41
Condition Leading To Less Guilt Intensity	51	4.96	2.46	54	5.54	2.38

Note. All values reflect ratings from only the negative outcome conditions.

[a] $F\ (1, 112) = 0.16$, ns.

[b] $F\ (1, 117) = 5.91$, $p < .05$.

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